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This paper examines the role of structural factors—governance and rule of law,
corporate sector governance (creditor rights and shareholder rights), corporate
financing structure—as well as macroeconomic variables in currency crises.
Using a technique known as a binary recursive tree allows for interactions
between the various explanatory variables. It is found that structural vulnerabili-
ties play an important role in the occurrence of “deep” currency crises (those with
a real GDP growth decline of at least 3 percentage points) and that there are com-
plex interactions between these structural vulnerabilities and macroeconomic
imbalances. [JEL F31, F41, F47]
T
here is a growing body of literature that seeks to identify, or even predict, cir-
cumstances under which countries may suffer balance of payments crises.
Much of this literature, inspired by the theoretical models of Krugman (1979) and
Flood and Garber (1984), emphasizes the role of macroeconomic imbalances—
large fiscal deficits or excessive rates of credit expansion—as the underlying cause
of currency crises (while the proximate triggers may be contagion effects or
imprudently low levels of foreign exchange reserves).
Yet the Asian crisis countries, in particular, do not readily fit this mold.
Exchange rates in these countries were not especially overvalued, fiscal deficits
were small, and macroeconomic performance had generally been exemplary.
Rather, structural weaknesses in the corporate and financial sectors appear to have
been at play. This paper seeks to complement much of the existing literature on
currency crises by examining the role of structural factors and vulnerabilities.1
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1In recent, parallel work, Mulder, Perrelli, and Rocha (2001) examine the role of structural factors in
currency crises using a probit framework; see also Stone and Weeks (2001). At least in East Asia, weak corporate and public sector governance appears to
have encouraged an environment of excessive risk taking by the corporate and
financial sectors, resulting in highly vulnerable corporate financing structures,
with too much reliance on debt rather than equity issuance, and a large fraction of
short-term rather than long-term borrowing.2 But such vulnerable corporate
financing structures, while a feature of the East Asian experience, are by no means
unique to it and may have been at play in other currency crises as well.3
Identifying such structural determinants of currency crises is important for at
least two reasons. First, inasmuch as these weaknesses, like macroeconomic
imbalances, contribute to the probability of a currency crisis, eliminating them is
clearly a priority. Second, if structural factors are at play, then faced by a such cri-
sis, announcing and implementing structural reforms may be crucial in restoring
confidence to the markets.
We examine the role of corporate sector vulnerabilities in currency crises using
a panel dataset covering some 40 industrialized and emerging market countries,
over the period 1987–1999. Our list of crises is taken from Glick and Hutchison
(1999), except that, for the bulk of our analysis, we focus on “deep” currency
crises—that is, those in which there was an appreciable decline in real GDP
growth.4 In addition to the usual macroeconomic suspects, we consider four broad
categories of structural indicators. The first pertains to what might be termed the
country’s overall “rule of law,” including ratings on public sector corruption, risk of
government expropriation or contract repudiation, and efficiency of the judicial sys-
tem and legal and accounting standards. The second and third categories concern
corporate governance directly, and pertain to the rights and responsibilities of
shareholders and creditors, respectively.5 Weak corporate governance, resulting, in
part, from inadequate shareholder and creditor rights, may be manifested in a risky
financing structure of corporations (e.g., with an overreliance on short-term debt).
As a final category, therefore, we also include corporate debt-equity ratios and
maturity structure of debt (medians for a sample of firms in each country). 
Much of the literature on currency crises to date has used probit analysis to
relate the probability of a crisis to a vector of explanatory variables. Such probit
models underlie most of the “early warning systems” for currency crises being
implemented in both the private and public sectors.6Although the precise explana-
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2In addition, the lack of deep domestic bond markets in many of these countries contributed to a
reliance on bank borrowing as a source of finance.
3For instance, in the sample below, in addition to East Asia, other countries in which the corporate
sector had a relatively high proportion of short-term debt include Turkey, Hungary, Greece, Poland, and
Peru, while debt-equity ratios were high in the Nordic countries. 
4Glick and Hutchison (1999) define a currency crisis as a “large” change (more than two standard
deviations from the country-specific mean for the country) of an index of currency pressure, defined as
the weighted average of monthly real exchange rate changes and monthly (percent) reserve losses. To
focus on cases in which there is an appreciable decline in real GDP growth, we use two cutoffs: those cur-
rency crises involving a decline in real GDP growth of at least 3 percentage points, and those involving a
decline of at least 5 percentage points (relative to the previous five years). 
5Note that some elements of the “rule of law” such as accounting standards and efficiency of the judi-
cial system also have a direct bearing on the exercise of corporate governance. 
6See, for instance, the proceedings of the Economic Forum on Early Warning Systems, hosted by the
IMF on November 1, 2001 (reported in the IMF Survey, November 12, 2001).tory variables differ across models, they normally include indicators of macro-
economic imbalances—current account deficits, real exchange rate overvaluation,
rapid rates of credit growth, and budget deficits—and, in some recent studies, var-
ious indicators of structural vulnerability as well. 
These probits give the marginal effect on the probability of a crisis of each of
the explanatory variables, holding the others constant at their mean values. While
this “other things being equal” (ceteris paribus) assumption is common in eco-
nomics, it is not the most natural assumption to make when assessing the risk of
an event because it does not readily allow for interactions between the various
explanatory variables; indeed, in many other contexts, the ceteris paribus assump-
tion would be considered quite odd. 
Take,f or instance, a doctor diagnosing a patient’s risk of a heart attack, and
suppose that both a history of heart problems in the immediate family (hereditary
factors) and high (LDL) cholesterol levels are known to be contributory factors.
The equivalent of a “probit” approach would be one in which the doctor considers
the marginal effect of the patient’s cholesterol level, holding constant his family
history at the (population) mean. But no doctor would do this. Rather, it would be
much more natural to first ascertain whether there was any history of heart attacks
among the patient’s relatives. If the answer was yes, then the “danger” level of
cholesterol may be 130, and the patient’s cholesterol assessed in relation to this
level. On the other hand, if the answer to a family history of heart attacks was no,
a higher level of cholesterol, say 150, may be tolerable.7
In much the same vein, a country may be vulnerable to a crisis because of struc-
tural deficiencies but only suffer a currency crisis when macroeconomic imbal-
ances become sufficiently severe. Such “context-dependence” is also reflected in
the theoretical literature on currency crises. First-generation models emphasize the
inconsistency of policies—governments intent on money-financing their deficit
while trying to maintain a fixed exchange rate—as the underlying cause of the cri-
sis. Second-generation models emphasize the cost of maintaining the pegged
exchange rate regime, for instance in the face of high unemployment, which under
certain circumstances (when the country is within a “zone of vulnerability”) can
trigger a speculative attack. Third-generation models are built around potential
structural vulnerabilities—especially foreign currency debt exposure of the corpo-
rate and financial sectors—leading to a self-fulfilling run on the currency. In any
panel dataset, it is likely that each of these various generations (or variants thereof)
is represented. If these are simply lumped together, factors that are important in
determining one type of crisis may not be identified because they do not help
explain the other types of crises. 
As a methodological innovation of this paper, therefore, we go beyond stan-
dard probit analysis and use a decision-theoretic classification technique known as
a binary recursive tree (BRT). This technique is particularly well suited to situa-
tions in which there may be “context dependence” and threshold effects. To the
extent that there are different types of crises represented in the dataset, for
instance, the classification tree can separate these and then examine the interaction
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7The figures used here are purely illustrative. of the various variables in determining a currency crisis. Such interactions could
be especially important here because structural factors typically do not change
very rapidly, so their ability to predict crises in a panel (or time series) context may
be limited. Rather, we would expect the interaction of relatively long-standing
structural vulnerabilities and high(er)-frequency movements in macroeconomic
variables to account for currency crises. For instance, the East Asian crisis coun-
tries had structural vulnerabilities for a number of years prior to the onset of the
crisis; there must have been a confluence of events—structural vulnerabilities,
macroeconomic imbalances, and perhaps contagion—to have actually triggered
the crisis. Not only does the binary recursive tree help identify factors that may
trigger (various types) of currency crisis, it can also be used to refine traditional
probit models. 
Our main results may be summarized briefly. First, we confirm that macroe-
conomic imbalances, most notably a large current account deficit, are often the
proximate trigger of a crisis. Second, we find that a weak “rule of law” may make
countries particularly vulnerable to the effects of macroeconomic imbalances.
Third, a risky corporate finance structure—high debt-equity ratios and short matu-
rity of corporate debt—is an important determinant of currency crises. When these
debt-equity ratios and maturity composition of corporate debt are included, the
indicators of shareholder and creditor rights figure less prominently, suggesting
that the effect of the latter on the probability of a crisis is manifested mostly
through the financing structure of corporations. Finally, we find that the interac-
tion between structural vulnerabilities and macroeconomic imbalances in deter-
mining crises is often highly complex, highlighting the difficulties of undertaking
effective surveillance and monitoring of countries’potential vulnerability to crises. 
I. Corporate Governance and Structural Vulnerabilities
Although structural factors may have been at play in previous crises, it was the
Asian currency crises at end-1997 and 1998 that brought them to the fore. 
A key hypothesis put forward in the context of the East Asian crisis is that the
corporate incentive structure encouraged a rapid pace of investment that was of
increasingly uncertain quality.8 The rapid pace of investment and, in some cases,
progressively lower returns on these investments made it necessary for firms to
seek financing outside of retained earnings. Given the corporate governance envi-
ronment and a traditional reluctance to dilute family shareholdings, this demand
for outside financing took the form of borrowing rather than equity issuance. 
Corporate governance refers to the rules, standards, and organizations that
govern the behavior of corporate owners, directors, and managers and that define
their duties and accountabilities to outside investors (Prowse, 1998). It is thus a
key element in exercising discipline on firms and defining the overall incentive
framework for firms, and is therefore essential for efficient, productivity-driven
investments and safeguards against excessive risk taking.9
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8See, for example, Alba and others (2000).
9Competition in the product markets is another channel through which discipline is exercised on firms.Mechanisms that facilitate good corporate governance may be grouped into
those that govern the rights of (especially minority) shareholders, those that gov-
ern the rights of creditors, and those that facilitate enforcement of these rights as
well as monitoring and disciplining.10
Within the first category, there are measures that strengthen shareholders’rights
in general, those that strengthen minority shareholders’ abilities to exercise gover-
nance, and those that strengthen the rights of “strategic” investors. If the minimum
percentage of ownership of share capital required to call an emergency sharehold-
ers’ meeting is relatively low, for instance, this makes it easier for minority share-
holders to organize a meeting to challenge or oust the management. (The percentage
varies around the world from 1 percent of share capital in the United States to 33
percent in Mexico). Or, if proxy by mail is allowed, (any) shareholders’ ability to
exercise their voting rights is considerably facilitated. For strategic investors, the
right to hostile takeovers may be an important disciplining mechanism.
Creditor rights are conceptually more complex because creditors exercise their
power in several ways. Perhaps the most basic creditor right is the right to repos-
sess and then liquidate—or keep—the collateral (La Porta and others, 1998).
Creditor rights are strengthened if, for example, the bankruptcy or reorganization
laws stipulate restrictions on reorganization, such as the need for creditors’ con-
sent to file for reorganization; or if secured creditors are ranked first in the distri-
bution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm.
Also important, however, is the incentive structure of creditors or financial insti-
tutions themselves, which is shaped not only by their own corporate governance,
prudential norms, and regulatory and supervisory framework, but also by the per-
ception of implicit government guarantees. Strong creditor rights without the cor-
responding good governance of financial institutions will still result in weak
disciplining of corporations. 
Finally, there is a set of rules and regulations that facilitate monitoring and dis-
ciplining, including the legal framework (enforcement and insolvency/bankruptcy or
exit mechanisms), accounting standards, transparency, and disclosure, etc. 
Weak corporate governance is often reflected in a divergence between
“control rights” and “cash-flow rights,”11 in turn, encouraging excessive risk
taking in investments. Through control-enhancing mechanisms such as pyra-
miding,12 cross-holdings, or having a chief executive officer, board chairman,
or vice chairman related to the controlling family, cash-flow rights can deviate
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10Until recently, the literature on corporate governance focused on the potential conflicts between
shareholders and managers. In East Asia, however, major shareholders and managers have tended to be
one and the same, giving them almost complete discretionary power to commit company resources. In the
East Asian context, therefore, the issue has been of having a few inside owner/managers on the one hand,
and outside minority shareholders and financiers on the other. The contention, therefore, is that the mech-
anisms to exercise corporate governance over the insider shareholders were weak in the region.
11“Cash-flow rights” refers to the claim on the profits of the corporation associated with the owner-
ship of the stock; however, under certain circumstances, a group owning less than a majority of the cash-
flow rights may, nevertheless, exercise “control rights,” for instance by stock pyramids, cross-ownership
structures, and dual class equity structures. 
12Pyramiding is defined as owning a majority of the stock of one corporation that, in turn, owns a
majority stock of another—a process that can be repeated a number of times.substantially from control rights. Such deviations, if significant, can provide
incentives for greater risk taking (both in the nature of investments and in their
volume and pace), as corporate owners have less to lose if the project goes
wrong (since their cash-flow stake is relatively small), but can benefit if the
project is successful—because, through their effective control, they can more
easily expropriate the gains. Particularly in East Asia, these perverse incentives
were exacerbated because management was generally not separated from own-
ership control.13 The combination of concentrated family control rights that
exceeded cash-flow rights, and close control of management by family owners,
provided corporate owners both greater incentives for risk taking and the means
for effecting this.
Excessive risk taking, in turn, can result in a fast pace of investment (often
with progressively declining rates of return), necessitating financing outside of
firms’ retained earnings. This financing often takes the form of debt, because of
the incentive structure of debt, where default allows the borrower to limit the
downside risk (particularly in countries where creditors’ recourse to bankruptcy
proceedings is limited), while capturing the gains if the project is successful.
Beyond this, however, particularly in the East Asian context, there is often a gen-
eral reluctance by family owners to dilute their share of ownership as well.
Greater integration of the world capital markets allows for easier access 
to foreign borrowing by domestic corporations—be it directly or indirectly
through the intermediation of domestic financial institutions—so that a sizable
proportion of this borrowing may be external. Moreover, the macroeconomic
policy mix used to deal with capital inflows and attendant macroeconomic
overheating, can itself further encourage unhedged short-term borrowing,14
exacerbating the accumulation of large short-term external liabilities. At the
micro level, this can result in highly leveraged corporations and sizable cur-
rency and maturity mismatches in the balance sheets of both corporations and
financial institutions.
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13See Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (1999).
14The macroeconomic policy mix in the East Asian crisis countries tended to encourage the accu-
mulation of external liabilities, mainly on a short-term and unhedged basis. Macroeconomic overheating
and capital inflows tended to move in tandem (e.g., Indonesia in 1990 and 1994–96, Korea in 1994–95).
In dealing with the overheating, countries often relied on monetary policy as the primary instrument,
which reinforced the upward movement of domestic interest rates and provided further incentives to bor-
row abroad. Since short-term capital flows tend to be most responsive to interest rate differentials, this
accumulation was primarily in the form of short-term liabilities. Moreover, given the managed exchange
rate system in these countries, the buildup of net foreign assets of the central banks was largely steril-
ized in order to limit the growth of reserve money and maintain monetary aggregates, which meant that
the large interest rate differentials were sustained. And, although the East Asian countries’fiscal position
was sound—entailing low levels of government debt and high savings—the fiscal impulse tended to be
positive at a time when domestic demand pressures picked up. Thus the fiscal position added to aggre-
gate demand and interest rate pressures. Finally, their exchange rate policy reduced incentives to hedge
the external borrowing. Although, in principle, all countries adopted some form of managed exchange
rates (which—to differing degrees across countries—were allowed to fluctuate within bands), in prac-
tice, the nominal exchange rates did not tend to vary much, and the exchange rate policy resulted in rel-
atively predictable nominal exchange rates. II. Methodology
The standard approach in the currency crisis literature is to estimate a probit of the
occurrence of a crisis on a set of explanatory variables.15 Such an approach has the
benefit of being familiar, with well-known statistical properties, and of being able
to isolate the marginal effect of each individual explanatory variable, holding the
others constant at their mean values. This “other things being equal” (or “partial
derivative”) assumption is such a standard part of an economist’s toolkit that it is
seldom questioned. As noted in the introduction, however, it is not the only
approach, and not necessarily the best approach for analyzing crises.
In particular, standard economic analysis implicitly assumes some continuity
in the relationships between economic variables. That is, if increasing variable x
elicits a certain response in variable y,t hen doubling the increase in x should
induce a correspondingly large response in y. Currency crises differ in that they
are fundamentally discontinuous; that is, they represent a confluence of factors
that trigger a discrete event (the crisis), but only once certain thresholds have been
crossed. For instance, in Indonesia and Korea, there were long-standing weak-
nesses in the financial (and, in Korea, the corporate) sector. It required a particu-
lar confluence of events—terms of trade shocks, contagion, and political
uncertainty—interacting with these weaknesses to trigger the crisis.
Accordingly, analyzing crises requires a technique that allows both for thresholds
in the effects of an independent variable on the probability of a crisis and, moreover,
for the thresholds themselves to depend on interactions between the variables.16
In principle, it would be possible to capture such interactions within a probit
framework by including sufficiently many interactive dummy variables—for instance,
estimating the probit with an interaction term between corporate governance indica-
tors and the current acccount deficit. When there are several explanatory variables,
and if they are continuous, however, such an approach soon becomes impractical.
Fortunately, more systematic methods are available. One such technique is
known as a binary recursive tree (BRT).17 Formally, it is a sequence of rules for
predicting a binary variable, y, on the basis of a vector of explanatory variables,
xj j=1,...,J. At each branch of the tree, the sample is split according to some thresh-
old value, x ˆj, of one of the explanatory variables into two sub-branches. The split-
ting is repeated along the various sub-branches until a terminal node is reached.
To illustrate, let y be the event of a crisis (equal to 1 if there is a crisis, and 0
otherwise). The sample is randomly separated into a core sample and a smaller test
sample, which is used for “out-of-sample” robustness checks. For the core sample,
the algorithm searches for sequential splits, each consisting of the explanatory
variable and its threshold value, which best discriminates between the groups.
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15For probit or regression-based studies of currency crises, see Frankel and Rose (1996); Eichengreen,
Rose, and Wyplosz (1996); Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996); Tornell (1999); Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999); and Berg and Pattillo (1999).
16In the analogy of heart attack risks, the danger threshold for cholesterol level might itself depend
on the patient’s family history. 
17See Breiman and others (1984); implementation of the BRT was undertaken using Salford System’s
CART program. Suppose, for example, that a large current account deficit is associated with cur-
rency crises and is thus a potentially useful discriminator variable. There will,
however, be countries that have a small current account deficit yet suffer a cur-
rency crisis (a type I error), and others that have a large current account deficit but
(nonetheless) do not have a crisis (a type II error). The algorithm searches over all
observed values of the current account deficit in the sample until it finds that
threshold value, x ˆj,w hich best discriminates between crisis and noncrisis countries
in the sense of minimizing the sum of the type I and type II errors.18
The minimum sum of errors provides a natural gauge of the ability of the cur-
rent account deficit variable to predict crises. The same procedure is applied to
each of the explanatory variables; then, sorting these variables by their minimum
error scores provides a ranking of their ability to discriminate between crisis and
noncrisis countries. (To check robustness, the threshold value for each variable is
also applied to the test sample, yielding a second error score.) The variable
(together with its associated threshold value, x ˆj) that has the lowest error score is
used to form the first node of the decision tree. All observations with a current
account deficit less than x ˆj are classified on the left sub-branch of the tree; all
observations with a current account deficit greater than x ˆj go to the right. 
For each sub-branch, the algorithm is repeated; once the initial data is parti-
tioned into two subsamples, each part of the tree is analyzed separately, so that the
discovery pattern becomes progressively more local. Thus the methodology is
very good at discovering local—context-dependent—data structures. In principle,
the process of progressive subdivision could continue until every observation has
been placed into its own branch. This would be akin to including as many explana-
tory variables as observations in a standard regression and thus getting a “perfect,”
if meaningless, fit. Some termination rule is required. The rule used is roughly the
same as an adjusted R2 rule. After each split, the improvement in the overall fit
(which, just like the change in the raw R2 on adding another variable in a regres-
sion, is always non-negative) is combined with a penalty on the number of
branches, which promotes parsimony. If the penalty exceeds the improvement, the
branch is terminated at the prior node; otherwise, the branching continues.
Several aspects of the algorithm are noteworthy. First, the algorithm automati-
cally establishes orderings among explanatory variables both globally (toward the
top of the tree) and locally (along each of the various sub-branches). Although an
explanatory variable that appears toward the top of the tree is more “important” in
discriminating between crisis and noncrisis countries, an explanatory variable may
appear several times along various sub-branches. To return to the heart attack exam-
ple, if the critical levels of cholesterol differ across men and women, one branching
of the tree might split the sample according to gender, then along each sub-branch
the level of cholesterol might be the next discriminator (albeit at different threshold
levels). Second, by its very nature, the algorithm captures interactions between
explanatory variables. Third, the algorithm is good at capturing threshold effects,
which may be particularly important in looking at the effects of structural variables.
By the same token, however, if the effect is truly continuous, the algorithm simply
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18It is also possible to weight the type I and type II errors in the loss function if, for example, it is
judged to be more costly to miss predicting a crisis than it is to call a false positive.finds the value that best discriminates between crisis and noncrisis countries. For
example, if the probability of a crisis increases linearly in the current account deficit,
the algorithm would still try to find the best “threshold” value for discriminating
between crisis and noncrisis countries. (This is relatively easy to detect, however,
because, when the effects are continuous, they tend to show up by repeated branch-
ings by the same explanatory variable along the same branch.19) Fifth, the procedure
is very robust to outliers since it splits on an interior threshold (rather like using
medians instead of means). Finally, the decision tree is invariant to any monotone
transformation of the variables. Again, this is a very important property when look-
ing at structural variables, several of which are rank indexes.
But the methodology is also not without its own limitations. Most importantly,
the statistical properties are not yet well known, and formal statistical tests are not
available. As such, the only way to assess the model is in terms of its ability to pre-
dict crises (more exactly, the likelihood that the model makes either a type I or
type II error). Second, as noted above, the procedure is less well suited when the
effects are genuinely continuous. Third, at each branch, the procedure picks out
the explanatory variable that best discriminates between crisis and noncrisis coun-
tries; this is not to suggest, however, that others may not be important (i.e., beaten
by only a small margin).20 Fourth, toward the lower branches of the tree, the num-
ber of crisis cases may become very small, sometimes leading to counterintuitive
results,21 though this can be avoided by more stringent stopping or pruning rules
to limit the number of sub-branches.
In our view, these limitations do not preclude the usefulness of this technique,
at least as a complement to the more standard probit/regression analysis. As dis-
cussed below, the resulting decision trees require careful interpretation but, if
nothing else, they make clear that currency crises occur as a result of a complex
confluence of factors—an insight that is perhaps lost in the simplicity of the stan-
dard probit output. Indeed, the binary recursive tree methodology can be used to
refine the probit analysis. 
III. Macroeconomic and Structural Data
Our dataset covers 42 industrialized and mainly emerging market countries over the
period 1987–99; with missing data, there are 624 observations.22 There are 52 cur-
rency crises, of which 19 involve a fall in real GDP growth of at least 3 percentage
points, and 14 involve a fall in real GDP growth of at least 5 percentage points.23
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19For instance, a branch would first divide on whether the current account deficit was greater than 2
percent of GDP, and then (at least one) of the sub-branches would divide on whether the current account
deficit was greater than 3 percent of GDP, etc.
20In a standard regression or probit, multicollinearity may imply that individual t-statistics are
insignificant; a binary recursive tree, however, simply picks the variable that best discriminates between
crisis and noncrisis countries from the vector of explanatory variables (if any at all). 
21For instance, if there is only one crisis observation remaining, and it happens, e.g., to be a country with
a current account surplus (and the only country remaining at that node with a current account surplus),the algo-
rithm will—at that node—pick out a current surplus as being a determinant of the country having a crisis.
22Some of the “rule of law” data were extended from 1995 assuming that they have been constant.
23The swing is defined as , where g is the growth rate of real GDP.
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...The traditional currency crisis literature has suggested a smorgasbord of both
macroeconomic policy and performance indicators (in addition to “vulnerability
indicators” such as the external debt ratio or the level of foreign exchange
reserves). Following this literature, but with a view to parsimony, we select five
“macroeconomic” indicators: (i) the percentage real exchange rate appreciation
over the previous three years (i.e., t–3 to t–1); (ii) the current account balance as
a ratio to GDP, averaged over the previous three years; (iii) the central government
balance as a ratio to GDP, averaged over the previous three years; (iv) the growth
of the ratio of banking system credit to GDP, averaged over the previous three
years; and (v), the ratio of total external debt to reserves.24 While not exhaustive,
this set captures most of the variables that have been identified in the literature as
relatively robust predictors of currency crises: external vulnerability, fiscal laxi-
tude, and excessive rates of credit growth.25
As noted above, for our structural variables, we include four broad categories,
each with a number of separate indicators.26
The first category consists of six indicators pertaining to the country’s rule of
law. These concern both broad governance issues—corruption and property rights
(such as risk of expropriation or contraction repudiation by the government, effi-
ciency of judicial system)—and those more narrowly related to the corporate and
financial sector such as accounting standards.
The second category consists of eight indicators related to shareholders’
rights. These include investor protection (such as whether ordinary shares carry
one vote per share) as well as indicators of the ease with which investors can exer-
cise their rights (whether proxy by mail is allowed; whether firms can block shares
prior to a general stockholders-meeting; whether minority shareholders have a
judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management; whether minority share-
holders can name a proportional number of directors to the board). Of the two
remaining indicators, one is a composite index of shareholders’ rights vis-à-vis
company directors, while the other is the percentage of mandatory dividend.
The third category consists of five indicators of creditors’rights. These include
the legal requirement for a firm to seek its creditors’ consent prior to filing for
reorganization; the requirement that management not stay during the period of
reorganization (with management in the hands of an official appointed by the court
instead); the requirement that secured creditors be paid first in any bankruptcy pro-
ceedings; and legal reserve requirements (which can force automatic liquidation
before all the capital is wasted or stolen). 
Finally, we include the ratio of short-term to total corporate debt, and the ratio
of debt to (common) equity for a sample of nonfinancial firms in each country,
taken from the WORLDSCOPE database. 
In general, within each category, the indicators tend to be correlated across
countries. The correlations are greatest for the “rule of law” indicators, ranging
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24While the ratio of short-term debt to reserves would have been preferable, consistent series for a
large sample of countries over this time period are not available. 
25See, for example, Berg and Pattillo (1999).
26The main source of these indicators is La Porta and others (1998) and the WORLDSCOPE
database; detailed descriptions of individual indicators are provided in the Appendix. from 0.6 to 0.9, with a single principal component capturing almost 80 percent of
the total variation. The creditor rights variables are somewhat less correlated, but
a single principal component captures more than 50 percent of the total variation,
while the shareholder variables are the least correlated, with a single principal
component capturing only 35 percent of the variation. 
The correlation among the various indicators seems intuitive, since countries
that have stronger creditor or shareholder rights along one measure are likely to
have strong rights along other measures. But it also means that these indicators are
subject to multicollinearity, and econometrically it may be difficult to isolate
which among them matters (especially since the indicators are qualitative scores
along arbitrary scales). Accordingly, in interpreting the results, if it is found that
one or more of the indicators (or the first principal component) of a given category
is significant, it is perhaps more useful to take this to mean that “shareholder
rights” or “creditor rights” broadly construed may be important, and not just the
individual indicator that happens to be significant. 
There is also the correlation across categories. The first principal component of
the shareholder rights category has a correlation of 0.29 (t-statistic: 3.29**) with the
(first principal component of) the creditor rights category; it is rather less correlated
with the “rule of law” category (correlation = 0.05). Stronger shareholder rights are
also (negatively) correlated with higher debt-equity ratios or a larger fraction of
short-term debt (with t-statistics of 3.67** and 6.13**). Again, this makes intuitive
sense. Countries with strong shareholder rights are also likely to have strong cred-
itor rights27 and, as a result of the better corporate governance and matching of cash
flow and control rights, lower debt-equity ratios and a better maturity of debt. By
the same token, however, to the extent that better shareholder and creditor rights
affect the probability of a crisis through their effect on corporate debt-equity ratios
and financing structure, they are unlikely to be significant in a probit or binary
recursive tree once the short-term debt and debt-equity ratios are included directly. 
IV. Empirical Results
Probit Results
Since probit analysis is generally familiar, we begin by estimating standard pro-
bits for three dependent variables: (i) the occurrence of a balance of payments
(BOP) crisis; (ii) a BOP crisis with at least a 3 percentage point growth swing; and
(iii) a BOP crisis with at least a 5 percentage point growth swing.
We  begin, in panel [1] of Table 1, with only the macroeconomic indicators.
These are mostly consistent with intuition: a greater real exchange rate appreciation
is associated with a higher probability of a crisis, while a larger current account
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27This is not to suggest that there are not differences within a country between creditor rights and
shareholder rights. Indeed, the corporate governance literature often emphasizes these differences in dis-
cussing, for instance, the rather different corporate control mechanisms between Germany (creditor-
based) and the United States (shareholder-based). Nonetheless, in comparing very diverse countries, one
might expect some to be stronger in terms of both shareholder and creditor rights, while others are weak
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Table 1. Probit Estimation of Probability of a Currency Crisis 
with Various GDP Growth Swings
Crisis with  Crisis with 
GDP Growth GDP Growth
Balance of  Swing of  Swing of 
Payments  at Least 3  at Least 5
Crisis Percentage Points Percentage Points
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
[1] Macroeconomic determinants only
Constant –1.541 –11.01*** –2.059 –9.49*** –2.283 –9.10***
∆REER1 0.027 2.30** 0.035 2.06** 0.036 1.86*
CAB/GDP1 –0.086 –3.18*** –0.119 –2.79*** –0.122 –2.46**
GovB/GDP1 0.012 0.51 0.039 1.08 0.066 1.52*
∆(DC/GDP)1 0.004 0.65 0.001 0.14 0.006 0.69
Ext. Debt/Reserves2 0.000 0.97 0.000 0.32 0.000 0.89
Number of observations:
positive observations 536 48 536 17 536 12
Loglikelihood:
percent correct predicted –152.2 91.0 –67.7 96.0 –49.8 97.0
[2] Macroeconomic and structural determinants
Constant –3.513 –0.962 –80.341 –0.001 –67.933 –0.007
∆REER1 0.014 0.682 0.058 1.224 0.109 1.428
CAB/GDP1 –0.136 –2.723*** –0.543 –2.867*** –0.358 –1.809*
GovB/GDP1 0.037 0.745 0.163 0.870 0.094 0.467
∆(DC/GDP)1 0.035 3.402*** 0.045 1.413 0.067 1.474
Ext. Debt/Reserves2 0.000 1.574 0.001 2.182** 0.001 2.035**
Mcorp1 (one share, one vote) –0.149 –0.306 17.725 0.003 20.425 0.014
Mcorp2 (proxy by mail allowed) –1.089 –0.886 –18.059 –0.001 –33.372 –0.009
Mcorp3 (shares blocked before meeting) 0.789 0.570 26.504 0.002 34.426 0.009
Mcorp4 (cumulative voting rights) –0.333 –0.255 –16.770 –0.001 –28.712 –0.007
Mcorp5 (oppressed minority) –0.331 –0.306 –40.733 –0.004 –49.677 –0.015
Mcorp6 (percent share capital 
to call meeting) 3.353 0.590 125.194 0.002 159.188 0.012
Mcorp7 (anti–director rights) 0.490 0.413 24.253 0.002 35.330 0.011
Mcorp8 (mandatory dividend) 0.849 0.658 31.068 0.001 7.901 0.001
Mcred1 (restrictions on reorganization) –0.007 –0.029 –7.913 –0.007 –9.754 –0.018
Mcred2 (automatic stay on assets) 0.748 1.709* –13.653 –0.010 –14.578 –0.013
Mcred3 (secured creditors paid first) 1.004 1.824* 14.885 0.001 8.357 0.003
Mcred4 (management stays 
in reorganization) –1.397 –2.167** 11.377 0.001 9.558 0.005
Mrule1 (efficiency of judicial system) –0.340 –2.096** –1.937 –0.002 –1.970 –0.006
Mrule2 (rule of law) 0.161 0.685 2.668 0.000 7.114 0.006
Mrule3 (corruption in government) 0.003 0.019 –0.843 0.000 –2.096 –0.004
Mrule4 (risk of expropriation) 0.532 1.200 9.863 0.004 4.010 0.004
Mrule5 (risk of contract repudiation) –0.545 –1.366 –13.077 –0.006 –10.912 –0.009
Mrule6 (accounting standards) 0.015 0.673 0.421 0.001 0.120 0.002
Corporate short-term debt ratio –0.288 –0.278 –1.011 –0.287 –1.944 –0.409
Corporate debt-equity ratio 0.338 1.514 –1.028 –1.348 –1.105 –1.436
Number of observations:
positive observations 420 37 420 13 420 9
Loglikelihood:
percent correct predicted –95.8 91.7 –27.5 96.4 –18.8 97.6balance (i.e., smaller deficit) is associated with a lower probability of a crisis. A
rapid expansion of banking system credit (relative to GDP) and a higher ratio of
external debt-to-reserves are positively correlated with crises, but the coefficients
are not statistically significant. Counterintuitively, a larger fiscal balance is also
positively related to a crisis, although the coefficient is generally not significant.
Next, we turn to the structural factors, augmenting the probit with our structural
indicators (Panel [2] of Table 1). While it is possible to obtain sensible parameter
estimates for the “occurrence of crisis” dependent variable (column 1)—though
most of the coefficients are insignificant—for the crises with growth swings of 3 or
5 percent, there are simply too many individual structural variables to be included
simultaneously (the probit estimation does not converge).
One approach is to use the principal components of the three categories of struc-
tural indicators: corporate governance, creditor rights, and rule of law28; the debt-
equity and short-term debt ratios are included directly (Panel [3] of Table 1). Of the
macroeconomic variables, the current account balance continues to be highly sig-
nificant, while the real exchange rate appreciation loses its statistical significance.
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Table 1. (concluded)
Crisis with  Crisis with 
GDP Growth GDP Growth
Balance of  Swing of  Swing of 
Payments  at Least 3  at Least 5
Crisis Percentage Points Percentage Points
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
[3] Macroeconomic and structural determinants (principal components)
Constant –2.488 –5.35*** –3.518 –4.50*** –3.902 –4.12***
∆REER1 0.007 0.37 0.010 0.36 0.005 0.17
CAB/GDP1 –0.101 –2.62*** –0.190 –2.64*** –0.149 –1.95*
GovB/GDP1 –0.010 –0.28 0.022 0.37 0.060 0.86
∆(DC/GDP)1 0.029 3.52*** 0.024 2.01** 0.027 2.13**
Ext. Debt/Reserves2 0.000 1.20 0.000 0.94 0.000 1.14
Shareholder rights principal component 0.078 0.68 –0.065 –0.37 –0.105 –0.55
Creditor rights principal component 0.101 0.89 0.169 0.95 0.049 0.22
Rule of law principal component –0.252 –1.86* –0.364 –1.73* –0.253 –0.93
Corporate short-term debt ratio 0.130 0.19 0.520 0.49 1.243 0.90
Corporate debt-equity ratio 0.408 2.82*** 0.461 2.25** 0.439 1.89*
Number of observations:
positive observations 420 37 420 13 420 9
Loglikelihood:
percent correct predicted –107.2 91.2 –44.9 96.9 –33.1 97.9
Note: Asterisks denote significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**), and 1 (***) percent levels. 
1Average for years t–3,t–2,t–1.
2End-year t–1.
28The number of principal components to include for each category was chosen to ensure that at least
70 percent of the variation of the underlying indices is captured. Since principal components are orthog-
onal, excluding a principal component cannot affect the coefficients on those that are included. The rate of credit growth in the economy, however, now becomes highly significant.
Turning to the structural variables, the results are decidedly mixed. The principal
components of better shareholder rights and better creditor rights are insignificant,
while better rule of law is associated with a lower probability of a crisis. Finally, a
higher proportion of corporate short-term debt or a higher debt-equity ratio is corre-
lated with higher probabilities of a crisis (the latter being statistically significant).29
The statistical significance of the latter two variables suggests that they may
be masking the effects of stronger shareholder and creditor rights (i.e., the effect
of better shareholder and creditor rights on the probability of a crisis happens
mostly through the corporate financing structure). Dropping the short-term debt
and debt-equity variables confirms this in that the shareholder rights variable now
has a negative, and statistically significant, coefficient.30
One interpretation of the results is that structural factors are not very impor-
tant determinants of currency crises. In a sense, this should be none too surprising,
particularly in the context of a panel dataset. Most structural variables change very
slowly (some are constant for the country) so they have difficulty in explaining
why a crisis occurs when it does, though they may do better at explaining where
crises occur (i.e., in a purely, or largely, cross-country dataset). Put differently,
Korean corporations have had high debt-equity ratios for a number of years—why
did the crisis occur in 1997 and not in 1995? This leads to a second interpretation,
however, namely that there may be important interactions between structural vul-
nerabilities and macroeconomic performance (which can change rapidly) that can
explain currency crises. In principle, this can be done within the probit framework
by interaction terms between the structural and macroeconomic variables. In prac-
tice, deciding which interactions to include in the probit estimation is difficult
because there are potentially many. Therefore, we turn next to an approach that
allows for such interactions more systematically.
Binary Recursive Trees
As discussed above, a binary recursive tree is simply a technique for classifying
observations on a binary dependent variable (in our case, the occurrence of a currency
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29Mulder, Perrelli, and Rocha (2001) report probit results using almost identical explanatory variables
(but a different definition for the dependent variable) using monthly data for a panel of developing and
emerging market countries. Among their corporate vulnerability indicators, a higher ratio of current
assets/liabilities and greater profitability are associated with a lower probability of a crisis (and the coef-
ficients are statistically significant). Less intuitively, a larger share of short-term debt in total corporate
debt is associated with a lower probability of a crisis, and greater operational cash flow is associated with
a higher probability of a crisis (again, both coefficients are significant); among their legal and institutional
variables, strong creditor and shareholder rights are associated with lower probabilities of a crisis,
although higher scores on contract enforcement and accounting standards are positively correlated with
crises; finally, they find that greater bank and corporate external debt/exports and greater public/total debt
to foreign banks ratios are associated with higher probabilities of a crisis, but a higher ratio of bank
credit/GDP and a greater ratio of short-term/total external debt is associated with a lower probability of a
crisis. Structural variables have also been used in the growth literature: see Barth and others (1999);
Levine (1998); Mauro (1995); and in the literature on banking crises, Hutchison (1999). 
30The coefficient on the first principal component becomes –0.3 (t-stat. 1.78*) to –0.4 (t-stat. 1.89*)
for the 3- and 5-percentage-point real GDP growth swings, respectively; for the simple occurrence of a
currency crisis, the coefficient is –0.1 (t-stat.1.00).crisis) on the basis of a set of explanatory variables (in our case, the macroeconomic
and structural variables). Since the resulting trees can be quite involved, requiring
some interpretation, and in order to avoid a tedious taxonomy, we focus on the case
of crises with at least a 3 percentage point swing in the real GDP growth rate.31
Again, we begin with only the macroeconomic variables. Figure 1 illustrates
the resulting binary recursive tree, where the dependent variable is a currency cri-
sis with a 3 percentage point real GDP growth swing, and the explanatory vari-
ables are (i) the current account balance; (ii) the real exchange rate appreciation;
(iii) the government balance; (iv) the growth in the credit-to-GDP ratio; and (v) the
ratio of external debt to reserves.
The tree turns out to be particularly simple as there is a single node, with the
current account balance being the explanatory variable at threshold level of about
21/2 percent of GDP. The tree branches to the left node when the current account
balance is less than –2.6 percent of GDP (i.e., the deficit is greater than 21/2 per-
cent of GDP), and to the right node, otherwise. Along the lefthand branch, the
probability of a crisis is 7.5 percent; along the righthand branch (countries with
current account balances above –2.6 percent of GDP), the probability of a crisis is
only 1.1 percent.32 In other words, countries with current account deficits above
21/2 percent of GDP have a seven-fold greater probability of a crisis than countries
with smaller deficits.
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31Binary trees for the other cases are available from the authors. 
32Recall that there are 19 crisis observations in the sample, so the unconditional probability of a crisis
is only 3 percent. 
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Figure 1. Macroeconomic Determinants of Currency Crises1
1Probability of a currency crisis involving a decline in real GDP growth of at least 3 percentage points.
Figures in italics refer to within-node (i.e. conditional) probabilities of a crisis (in percent).Among the macroeconomic variables, the algorithm thus picks out the current
account balance as the most important variable distinguishing crisis from noncrisis
countries. Note that nothing prevents the algorithm from further splitting the tree
(using either the current account balance or any of the other potential explanatory
variables); however, the improvement in the fit is not sufficient to justify the addi-
tional complexity of the tree, given the stopping rule.
Within sample, the tree misclassifies 179 out of 624 observations (about 30 per-
cent); of these, 5 of the 19 crisis observations would have been missed by the tree,
and 174 out of 605 noncrisis observations would have been incorrectly called crises.
The “out-of-sample”33 statistics are very similar: 180 out of 624 observations are
misclassified, corresponding to 7 crisis observations and 173 noncrisis observations. 
Structural and macroeconomic determinants
Next, we add the various structural variables (individually, not in terms of their
principal components). The resulting tree, again with the conditional probabilities
of a crisis at each node, is illustrated in Figure 2.
The first branching of the tree is now the index of public sector governance,
with lower scores indicating greater corruption or that “high government officials
are likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are generally
expected throughout lower levels of government in the form of bribes connected
with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protec-
tion or loans.” The conditional probability of a crisis in countries that score in the
lower half of this governance index (across our sample of countries), i.e., that have
worse public sector governance, is 4.8 percent, versus 0.7 percent for countries
that score well. Hence, countries with low governance scores are almost seven
times more likely to have a crisis than countries with high scores.
Continuing along the lefthand branch of the tree, the second node (2) depends
on the current account balance; again with a threshold value of a deficit of about 21/2
percent of GDP. The conditional probability of a crisis in countries with larger
deficits is 9 percent compared to 2.2 percent in countries with smaller current
account deficits. Continuing along the lefthand branch (node (3)), the next variable
is the corporate debt-equity ratio (with a threshold at about 100 percent), and a con-
ditional probability of crisis of 14.7 percent for countries that exceed this threshold
(compared to a 3 percent probability of crisis for countries below that threshold).
Finally, at node (4), countries that have a high level of total external debt to reserves
have a much higher conditional probability of a crisis (though it should be noted that,
by this point, there are only two crisis observations remaining). 
Returning to the righthand branch of node (2) (countries that score badly on
the governance index but have a current account balance greater than 2.6 percent
Swati R.Ghosh and Atish R.Ghosh
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33When there are relatively few observations, as in the present case, the out-of-sample results are gen-
erated using a technique known as “cross-validation.” Under cross-validation, the sample is broken into
ten approximately equal-sized subsamples, with subsamples determined by random sampling stratified on
the dependent variable. The tree-growing process is then undertaken from scratch, using nine-tenths of the
data, with the final one-tenth of the data being used for “out-of-sample” prediction and the computation
of the error rate. This process is then repeated using each of the ten subsamples, and the out-of-sample
error rate reported is the average for the ten runs.of GDP), it is the real exchange rate that matters (node (5)), with a conditional
probability of a crisis of 7 percent for countries whose average real exchange rate
appreciation exceeds 21/2 percent. 
Finally, returning to the righthand branch of node (1) (countries that score well
on the governance index), it is the corporate debt-equity ratio that matters; those with
very high debt-equity ratios have a much higher conditional probability of a crisis.
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Figure 2. Macroeconomic and Structural Determinants of Currency Crises1
1Probability of a currency crisis involving a decline in real GDP growth of at least 3 percentage points.
Figures in italics refer to within-node (i.e. conditional) probabilities of a crisis (in percent).
2Country scores in the top half of the sample countries on the International Country Risk assessment of
public sector governance (low levels of public sector corruption).How should the tree be interpreted? 
The algorithm seems to identify two broad groups of crisis countries. For one
group, which consists mainly of the advanced industrialized countries and that
scores well on the public sector corruption index—probably a proxy for stronger
“rule of law” or governance generally—the distinguishing characteristic of coun-
tries that suffer currency crises are their banking and corporate sector vulnerabili-
ties (rather than macroeconomic imbalances). Put differently, these countries can
better support macroeconomic imbalances, such as current account deficits or real
exchange rate appreciations, with relatively less risk of crisis. 
The other group, mainly emerging market and developing countries, which
tend to score worse on the public sector corruption index, are more vulnerable to
macroeconomic imbalances. For this latter group of countries, the most crucial
variable is the current account deficit. Even if the current account deficit is mod-
est (less than 21/2 percent of GDP), however, they may still be vulnerable to the
effects of real exchange rate appreciations. 
Again for this group of countries, when the current account deficit is large,
the corporate debt-equity ratio matters, with a cutoff at about 95 percent. Notice
that these countries can support a much lower corporate debt-equity ratio (95
percent) compared to the advanced industrialized countries, with good gover-
nance, who can support much higher debt-equity ratios (the threshold at node
(6) is 380 percent). 
How well does the tree perform? 
A simple metric of the tree’s performance is the number of misclassified observa-
tions (either crisis countries predicted to be noncrisis, or vice versa). Recall that,
using only the macroeconomic variables, 179 out of 624 observations are incor-
rectly classified (in-sample); out-of-sample, 180 out of 624 observations are incor-
rectly classified. Once the structural variables are added, the number of incorrectly
classified observations drops to 130 out of 624 observations, in-sample. In fact, all
of the 19 crisis observations are correctly classified (so that all of the 130 incor-
rect classifications correspond to “false positives”). In the out-of-sample predic-
tions, 156 out of 624 observations are incorrectly classified (of which 10
correspond to crisis cases, and 146 are “false positive” noncrisis cases). Taking the
least favorable results, therefore, about 75 percent of all observations are correctly
classified, and about one-half of the currency crises that occurred would have been
predicted by the tree.34 The score on predicting crises could, presumably, be
improved by weighting type I errors more heavily in the algorithm’s objective
function, albeit at the cost of calling more false positives. 
Two additional points are worth noting. First, if the short-term debt and debt-
equity ratios are dropped from the list of explanatory variables, the resulting tree
Swati R.Ghosh and Atish R.Ghosh
498
34Note that since all the macroeconomic variables are lagged (mostly averages over the past three
years), while the structural variables are either constant or move very slowly, it would be fair to treat the
tree’s out-of-sample results as genuine predictions (rather than just fitted values). (not shown) again branches on the index of public sector corruption and the current
account deficit, but also on accounting standards, and the composite index of share-
holders’ rights vis-à-vis company directors (MCORP7).35 As above, this suggests
that the impact of corporate governance on the probability of a crisis occurs mostly
through the corporate financing structure. Second, if the Asian crisis countries
(Indonesia, Korea, Thailand) are dropped from the panel (to see whether the results
are being driven by them), structural variables continue to be included in the tree.
In particular, node (1) again splits on public sector governance, and node (6) splits
on the debt-equity ratio, and a sub-branch of node (5) splits on the corporate short-
term debt ratio; however, node (3) no longer exists. As a further robustness test, the
upper-income countries were excluded from the dataset to check whether the struc-
tural variables are really only picking up the distinction between developing/emerg-
ing market countries and industrialized countries. Dropping these countries leaves
the tree virtually unchanged, except that the new tree begins with the 21/2 percent
of GDP current account deficit threshold (i.e., the first node of this tree corresponds
to node (2) of Figure 2, and nodes (1) and (6)—which, as discussed above, reflect
the “industrialized country” crises—do not appear in this tree); the tree misclassi-
fies 120 out of 468 observations.
Naturally, different crisis definitions yield somewhat different trees. For
instance, if currency crises with the larger swing in real GDP growth is used as the
dependent variable instead, the first node no longer splits on the public sector cor-
ruption index, simply because there are no observations with such deep crises
among the group of advanced industrialized countries that score well on the pub-
lic sector governance index (i.e., corresponding to node (6) in Figure 2). The tree
therefore starts with the current account balance (again picking the threshold of
about 21/2 percent of GDP). Among countries with large current account deficits,
it is then the structure of corporate short-term debt and the debt-equity ratio that
matter, especially in an environment in which credit has been growing rapidly. In-
sample, of the 619 noncrisis observations, 10 are misclassified; of the 5 crisis
observations, none are misclassified. Out-of-sample, 14 noncrisis observations are
misclassified and 3 crisis observations are misclassified.
Alternatively, if the dependent variable is simply the occurrence of a balance
of payments crisis, the resulting tree is highly complex, involving some 17 differ-
ent nodes. The main explanatory variables are the current account balance, the
scores on the indices of public sector corruption, risk of government expropriation
and contract repudiation, the debt-equity ratio, the short-term debt ratio, the com-
posite index of shareholders’ rights vis-à-vis company directors, the minimum
percentage of ownership of share capital required to call an emergency share-
holders’ meeting, and the percentage of mandatory dividends. In-sample, of the
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35MCORP7 is La Porta and others’aggregate measure of shareholders’rights over company directors,
formed by adding 1 when (i) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (ii) shareholders are
not required to deposit their shares prior to a general shareholders meeting; (iii) cumulative voting or pro-
portional representation is allowed; (iv) oppressed minorities mechanisms are in place; (v) the minimum
percentage share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary meeting is less than or equal
to 10 percent (the sample median in La Porta and others; or (vi) shareholders have preemptive rights that
can be waived only by a shareholders’vote (the measure ranges from 0 to 6).572 noncrisis observations, 92 are misclassified, and of the 52 crisis observations
3 are misclassified; out-of-sample, these become 130 and 25, respectively.36
The precise structure of the trees, therefore, is perhaps of less importance than
the general conclusions that emerge. Of these, three bear emphasizing. First, cur-
rency crises come in a variety of flavors: occurring both in advanced industrialized
countries, with generally sound governance and stronger regulatory frameworks,
and in emerging market and developing countries, with much weaker records of
governance. Second, there are complex interactions between governance, macroe-
conomic, and corporate indicators that may contribute to the likelihood of a crisis,
and that are not easily captured with the very linear structure of a standard probit.
Third, given differences in the overall “rule of law” or governance, countries’
resilience to either macroeconomic imbalances or corporate sector vulnerabilities
may differ markedly.
Finally, the tree structure can also be used to refine the probit analysis, allow-
ing for context-dependence within the probit framework. As an illustration, Table
2 reports a probit of a 3 percent real GDP growth swing on the macroeconomic
and structural variables identified in the tree above (Figure 2). The first column
reports the probit results for the full sample, while the second and third columns
report the coefficients for two samples, separated according to the current account
balance node (i.e., whether the deficit is greater or less than 2.6 percent of GDP,
corresponding to node (2) in Figure 2).37 Splitting the sample according to the cur-
rent account node shows that there are qualitative differences between the corre-
sponding crises. For countries with large current account deficits, for instance, the
corporate debt-equity ratio becomes highly significant, in contrast to countries
with smaller current account deficits. 
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the role of structural factors in currency crises.
Given that structural variables typically do not change much, their ability to pre-
dict crises—especially in a panel or time-series context—is necessarily limited.
Nonetheless, the findings suggest that weak governance may make countries par-
ticularly vulnerable to the effects of macroeconomic imbalances and corporate
sector weaknesses. 
These interactions mean that standard regressions or probits may not be able
to identify vulnerabilities arising from a confluence of legal, macroeconomic, and
corporate factors. To this end, we have proposed the use of an alternative tech-
nique, known as a binary recursive tree, that is better suited to identifying such
interactions. While we consider our results to be mostly illustrative and, at best,
preliminary, we believe that this approach shows some promise.
The interactions also have implications for monitoring and country surveil-
lance work. In particular, they suggest that assessing countries according to a
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36These trees are available from the authors.
37Alternatively, the sample could be split at node (1), corresponding to the rule-of-law node. This
was not done because the number of crises in the RHS node is too small to obtain useful results using
the probit analysis.given list of vulnerability indicators is unlikely to suffice. Rather, the “danger”
thresholds depend very much on the particular combination of institutional,
macroeconomic, and corporate governance/financial structure indicators, and
each country must be assessed in light of these. 
APPENDIX
Structural Indicators
In the text, reference is made to a number of structural indicators. This appendix provides a
detailed description of them.
We consider four broad categories of structural indicators: rule of law; corporate gover-
nance (shareholder rights); corporate governance (creditor rights); and corporate performance.
1. Rule of Law (MRULE)
MRULE1 AND MRULE2 are measures that pertain to law enforcement. A strong system of
legal enforcement could even substitute for weak rules, to some extent, since active and well-
functioning courts can step in and rescue investors abused by the management. 
MRULE1 This measures the efficiency of the judicial system. The assessment of effi-
ciency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms,
is produced by the country risk-rating agency, Business International Corp. The index is the
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Table 2. Macro and Structural Determinants of Currency Crisis1
Conditional on: ———————————
Full sample CA/GDP < –2.65 CA/GDP > –2.65
Constant –1.667 –2.953 –0.782
t-stat –3.86*** –2.69*** –1.24
∆REER2 0.033 0.052 0.025
t-stat 1.84* 1.17 1.13
CAB/GDP2 –0.149 –0.427 –0.157
t-stat –2.97*** –2.47** –1.72*
Ext.Debt/Reserves3 0.000 –0.001 0.000
t-stat –0.60 –2.00** 0.17 
Mrule3 (corruption in government) –0.110 –0.308 –0.143
t-stat 1.90* –2.02** –1.58 
Corporate debt-equity ratio 0.256 1.393 –0.232
t-stat 1.74* 3.30*** –0.87 
Number of observations 469 139 329
Positive observations 18 9 9
Percent correctly predicted 96.2 95.0 97.3
Log Likelihood ratio –64.4 –20.4 –34.0
Note: Asterisks denote significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**), and 1(***) percent levels.
1Currency crisis with at least a three percentage point swing in real GDP growth rate.
2Average for years t–1, t–2, and t–3.
3End-year t–1. average between 1980 and 1983, and the scale ranges from 10 (most efficient) to 0 (least effi-
cient). A higher score indicates a better rule of law.
MRULE2 This variable is an assessment of the law-and-order tradition or rule of law
produced by the international rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). The index is an
average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. La
Porta and others change the scale of the index from its original range which went from 6 to 0)
into one that ranges from 10 (greatest tradition for law and order) to 1 (least tradition for law
and order). A higher score indicates a better rule of law.
MRULE3 and MRULE4 are variables that reflect how government affects businesses. 
MRULE3 This variable is an assessment by ICR of corruption in government. The
scale ranges from 10 to 0 (again La Porta and others changed the original range, which went
from 6 to 0), with lower scores indicating greater corruption or that “high government officials
are likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected through-
out lower levels of government in the form of bribes connected with import and export licenses,
exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans.” A higher score indicates a bet-
ter rule of law.
MRULE4 This is ICR’s assessment of the risk of outright confiscation or forced
nationalization, i.e., risk of expropriation. The score ranges from 10 (low risk) to 0 (high risk
of expropriation). A higher score indicates a better rule of law.
MRULE5 This variable is ICR’s assessment of the “risk of a modification in a contract
taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down” due to “budget cutbacks, indi-
genization pressure, change in government, or a change in government economic and social pri-
orities” or repudiation of contracts by government. The scale ranges from 10 (lowest risk) to
0 (highest risk). A higher score indicates a better rule of law.
MRULE6 This is an index of accounting standards created by examining and rating
companies’1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items. These items fall into
seven categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow state-
ments, accounting standards, stock data, and special items). A minimum of three companies in
each country were studied. These companies represent a cross section of various industry
groups: industrial companies represented 70 percent, and financial companies represented the
remaining 30 percent. The index ranges from 100 (highest) to 0 (lowest). A higher score indi-
cates better rule of law.
2. Corporate Governance: Shareholders’ Rights
MCORP1 This reflects investor protection. If the law stipulates that ordinary shares
carry one vote per share, La Porta and others assign it a value of one. In general, investors are
better protected when dividend rights are tightly linked to voting rights, i.e., one share, one
vote: when votes are tied to dividends, insiders cannot appropriate cash flows to themselves by
controlling only a small share of the company’s cash flows but still maintaining voting control.
Equivalently, this variable equals 1 if the law prohibits the existence of both multiple voting and
nonvoting shares, and does not allow firms to set a maximum number of votes per shareholder
irrespective of the number of shares owned (all of which are ways in which the one share, one
vote principle can be circumvented). It is set to zero otherwise. A higher score indicates
stronger shareholder rights.
The measures MCORP2 through to MCORP5 measure the ease with which shareholders
can exercise their voting rights. Because these rights measure how strongly the legal system
favors shareholders vis-à-vis managers in the voting process, La Porta and others refer to them
as anti-director measures. 
MCORP2 This is assigned a value of one if proxy by mail is allowed and zero other-
wise. Clearly proxy by mail facilitates shareholders’ability to exercise their voting rights. In fact,
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shareholders to exercise their votes (unless they go through the legal procedure of designating
proxies at meetings), especially if companies hold their annual meetings around the same time
(as tends to be the case in Japan, where about 80 percent of companies tend to hold their annual
meetings in the same week). A higher score indicates stronger shareholder rights.
MCORP3 This is assigned a value of one if the company law or commercial code does
not allow firms to block shares prior to a general shareholders’ meeting and zero other-
wise. In some countries the law requires that shareholders deposit their shares with a company
or financial intermediary prior to a shareholder meeting. The shares are kept in custody until a
few days after the meeting, which prevents shareholders from selling their shares for several
days around the time of the meeting. A higher score indicates stronger shareholder rights.
MCORP4 This is assigned a value of one if the company law or commercial code
allows shareholders to cast all their votes for one candidate standing for election to the board
of directors or allows for a mechanism of proportional representation in the board by which
minority interests may name a proportional number of directors to the board—i.e., if it allows
cumulative voting or proportional representation—and is assigned a value of zero other-
wise. A higher score indicates stronger shareholder rights.
MCORP5 This is assigned a value of one if the company law or commercial code
grants minority shareholders either a judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management
(including the right to sue directors as in American derivative suits) or of the assembly, or the
right to step out of the company by requiring the company to purchase their shares when they
object to certain fundamental changes such as mergers, asset dispositions, and changes in the
articles of incorporation. Thus this variable reflects minority shareholders’legal mechanisms
against perceived oppression by directors. The variable is set to zero otherwise. (Minority
shareholders are defined as those shareholders who own 10 percent of share capital or less.) A
higher score indicates stronger shareholder rights.
MCORP6 This is the minimum percentage of ownership of share capital required
to call an emergency shareholders’meeting. Clearly, the higher this percentage, the harder it
is for minority shareholders to organize a meeting to challenge or oust the management. (The
percentage varies around the world from 1 percent in the United States to 33 percent of share
capital in Mexico.) A higher score indicates weaker shareholder rights.
MCORP7 La Porta and others construct an aggregate measure of shareholders’rights
vis-à-vis company directors, formed by adding one when (i) the country allows shareholders
to mail their proxy vote; (ii) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to a gen-
eral shareholders’ meeting; (iii) cumulative voting or proportional representation is allowed;
(iv) oppressed minorities mechanisms are in place; (v) the minimum percentage of share capi-
tal that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary meeting is less than or equal to 10 per-
cent (the sample median in La Porta and others; or (vi) shareholders have preemptive rights that
can be waived only by a shareholders’vote. The index ranges from zero (low protection) to six
(high protection). A higher score indicates stronger shareholder rights.
MCORP8 This variable equals the percentage of firms’ declared earnings that the
company law or commercial code requires them to distribute as dividends among ordinary
shareholders, i.e., the percentage of mandatory dividend. Although earnings can, of
course, be misrepresented within the limits allowed by the accounting system, it at least pre-
vents declarations of high earnings by firms (which might be needed to raise additional
funds) without requiring dividend payouts. The mandatory dividend right (which is slightly
different from the other shareholder rights listed above) may be needed when other rights of
shareholders are too weak to induce them to invest. The variable is assigned a value of zero
when no such requirement exists in the law or commercial code. A higher score indicates
stronger shareholder rights.
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MCRED1 If the bankruptcy or reorganization laws stipulate restrictions on reorgani-
zation such as the need for creditors’consent to file for reorganization, the variable is assigned a
value of one. It equals zero if no such restrictions exist. A higher score indicates stronger credi-
tor rights.
MCRED2 This variable is assigned a value of one if there is no automatic stay on
assets. In some countries, the reorganization procedure imposes an automatic stay on the assets
upon filing the reorganization petition. An automatic stay prevents secured creditors from gain-
ing possession of their security. It is assigned a value of zero if the law stipulates an automatic
stay on assets. A higher score indicates stronger creditor rights.
MCRED3 This variable is assigned a value of one if secured creditors are ranked first in
the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm, i.e.,
if secured creditors are paid first. In some countries secured creditors are not assured the right
to collateral in reorganization (although this is rare). In Mexico, for example, various social con-
stituencies need to be repaid before the secured creditors, often leaving the latter with no assets
to back up their claims. The variable is set to zero if nonsecured creditors, such as the government
and workers, are given absolute priority. A higher score indicates stronger creditor rights.
MCRED4 If an official appointed by the court or by the creditors is responsible for the
operation of the business during reorganization, this variable is assigned a value of one.
Equivalently, the variable is assigned a value of one if the debtor does not keep the administra-
tion of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization process, i.e., if management
does not stay in reorganization. In some countries management stays pending resolution of
the reorganization procedure, whereas in other countries, such as Malaysia, management is
replaced by a party appointed by the court or creditors. The threat of dismissal may enhance
creditors’ power. The variable is given a value of zero if no such threat exists. A higher score
indicates stronger creditor rights.
MCRED5 This variable is the percentage of total share capital needed to avoid the dis-
solution of an existing firm as mandated by the corporate law, i.e., the legal reserve requirement.
This requirement forces firms to maintain a certain level of capital to avoid automatic liquidation.
As with the mandatory dividend in the case of shareholders, the legal reserve requirement protects
creditors when they have few other powers in that it forces an automatic liquidation before all the
capital is stolen or wasted. The variable takes the value of zero for countries without such a legal
reserve requirement. A higher score indicates stronger creditor rights.
4. Corporate Performance 
Finally, we construct a set of corporate vulnerability and performance indicators.38
CorpStDebt The ratio of short-term corporate debt to total corporate debt and, as such,
measures a firm’s vulnerability to liquidity squeeze. It is the median of all (nonfinancial) firms
in the WORLDSCOPE database. 
CorpDtEq The debt to (common) equity ratio, which provides an indication of a firm’s
vulnerability to interest rate spikes. It is the median of all (nonfinancial) firms in the WORLD-
SCOPE database.
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38Other variables, such as corporate earnings, are also available from WORLDSCOPE. These two
were chosen because they better capture the structural vulnerability to a crisis, rather than the (more)
endogenous variables, such as corporate earnings, that might be expected to move in response to the crisis.REFERENCES
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